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NOTE
NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY OF ARTISANS AND TRADESMEN
The purpose of this Note is to examine certain aspects of the tort
liability of nonprofessional persons who engage in a trade or craft
which requires skill and abilities not ordinarily possessed by the average man. Since, with such a wide range of subjects, an adequate treatment of all the problems peculiar to each trade would require volumes, it is necessary at the outset to place rather narrow limitations
on the scope of this analysis. Perhaps it is best to define the outside
limits in the form of two "issues" as follows. When a person engages
in a certain trade or craft and holds himself out to the public as
competent to perform the specialized services ordinarily identified
therewith, and when he undertakes to perform those specialized services for a consideration: (1) What is the standard of skill and care
demanded of him in order that he not be held liable in tort for negligent performance; and (2) Under what circumstances will he be
liable for negligent performance to persons not in privity of contract?
Normally in a discussion of this type one would expect the defendants to be John Jones, village blacksmith, or Henry Smith, plumber.
But the job of the artisan has been taken over to a large extent by
large corporations and it is not unusual to find that the heating system
in a residence was installed by the Standard Oil Company of California, or that E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. is being sued in tort for
the negligent installation of a door handle. In spite of the names of
the litigants, however, the "issues" as outlined above remain the same.
I. STAMARD OF CARE
Much has been written about the standard of care demanded of
physicians, dentists, attorneys and accountants,' and oftentimes it
would appear that a peculiar set of rules applies to professional men
as a class. But this is not true unless there is included within the
definition of "profession" practically any skill or trade where those
2
engaging in it must possess a particular skill or ability. The following
rule was propounded at an early stage in the development of the common law: "If a smith prick my horse with a nail, etc., I shall have
my action upon the case against him, without any warranty by the
smith to do it well... For it is the duty of every artificer to exercise
his art rightly and truly as he ought."3
1. See, e.g., Symposium on ProfessionalNegligence, 12 VAND. L. R-v.535-824
(1959).
2. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 299A (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1959).
3. Y. B. 46 Edw. 3, f. 19 p1. 19 (1372), as quoted in PoLIocK, LAW OF TORTS
335 (15th ed. 1951).
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The more elaborate American version of the same rule is:
It is a general rule of law that, when a person holds himself out to the
public in any particular employment, work, or trade, there is an implied
agreement with those who may employ him that he and his employees
in that trade or business possess that reasonable degree of knowledge
and skill which is ordinarily possessed by others engaged in the same
business or trade; and that he and they will perform the services which
he may be engaged to do, diligently and faithfully, and with that skill
and prudence ordinarily possessed and observed by others engaged in
the same or like employment.4

Thus there are two elements in the standard of care. The actor must
possess a certain minimum of skill and apply his skill with reasonable

care.5 The degree of skill required has been expressed in a variety of
ways, but none of them seems to add to or detract from the test

previously set forth to any noticeable extent. A sampling of the terminology reveals: the skill of his art,6 ordinary skill and ability of

persons engaging in this business practicing in the locality,7 such reasonable skill as the nature of the service may require,8 skill which one
impliedly held himself out as exercising, 9 and the amount of skill
which would enable one to do the work in a reasonable and proper
manner. 10 The rule has been applied to a blacksmith, furrier, 12 machinist, 3 oil well petrofracturer, 14 aerial seeder, 5 garageman, 6 dry
cleaner, 7 hairdresser, 8 electrician, 19 general contractor 2 0 restaura- 4. Pusey v. Webb, 18 Del. 490, 47 Atl. 701 (1900) (blacksmith).
.5. Stevens v. Moore, 24 Tenn. App. 61, 139 S.W.2d 710 (1940) (dry cleaner).
6. "The amount of care to be used varies with the instrumentality dealt
with; where
it is inherently dangerous, more care is necessary in regard to
it than where it is, according to common experience, a thing relatively harmless even where defectively constructed or negligently used. Therefore, what
amounts to the exercise of ordinary care under all the circumstances is a
question for the jury, but ordinary care, not extraordinary care is still
the yardstick." Hand v. Harrison, 99 Ga. App. 429, 108 S.E.2d 814 (1959)
(installing steam tables).
7. Barnett v. Roberts, 243 Mass. 233, 137 N.E. 353 (1922) (hairdresser).
8. Van Nortvick v. Holbine, 62 Neb. 147, 86 N.W. 1057 (1901) (wheat
thresher).
9. Flint & Walling Mfg. Co. v. Beckett, 167 Ind. 491, 79 N.E. 503 (1906)
(windmill erector).
10. Lincoln v. Gay, 164 Mass. 537, 42 N.E. 95 (1895) (dressmaker).
11. Pusey v. Webb, 18 Del. 490, 47 Atl. 701 (1900).
12. Douglass v. Hart, 103 Conn. 685, 131 AtI. 401 (1925), 44 A.L.R. 820
(1926).
13. Arkansas Machine & Boiler Works v. Moorhead, 136 Ark. 18, 205 SW.
980 (1918), 1 A.L.R. 1652 (1919).
14. Dowell, Inc. v. Lyons, 265 F.2d 521 (6th Cir. 1959).
15. Aerial Agricultural Service of Montana v. Richard, 264 F.2d 341 (5th Cir.
1959).
16. Simms v. Sullivan, 100 Ore. 487, 198 Pac. 240 (1921), 15 A.L.R. 678.
17. Stevens v. Moore, 24 Tenn. App. 61, 139 S.W.2d 710 (1940).
18. Barnett v. Roberts, 243 Mass. 233, 137 N.E. 353 (1922); Annot., 14
A.L.R.2d 860 (1950).
19. Person v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 187 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 936 (1951); Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 1448 (1949).
20. Ibid.
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teur,2 ' livery stable keeper,2 2 tree expert,23 dressmaker,24 windmill
erector 2 5 plumber,2 6 brick contractor, 27 wheat thresher,2 8 and a drayman.2 9 The standard is premised on the feeling that even though the
actor "might be an ordinarily prudent man... if he had no experience
or skill in the particular work in which he is engaged, disastrous results would be liable to follow.

30

Although the duty arises in the first instance by contract, we are
not concerned here with actions for breach of contract but with actions in tort for negligence; hence the standard of care required is a
tort standard and not a contract standard. 31 Ordinarily the tort and
contract standards will be the same as when the contract provides
"that the work shall be performed in a good workmanlike manner"3
or when nothing is expressed as to the standard required. 33 But "the
specifications of the contract do not determine the standard of care;
proof of compliance with the spegifications by the defendant is not
of itself a defense nor, on the other hand, would proof of their violation without more make a case for the plaintiff."34 "Therefore, any
contract provision prescribing a different standard of care from that
imposed by the rule of the common law is not relevant to the issue
of actionable negligence and should be stricken on motion. '35
Persons falling within this group are not insurers of the public, nor
are they bound to use the safest methods or tools available in rendering their services. 36 It will generally suffice if they comply with the
21. Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Waldrop, 237 Ala. 208, 186 So. 151 (1939).
22. Deming v. Johnson, 80 Conn. 553, 69 Atl. 347 (1908).
23. Porter v. Davey Tree Expert Co., 34 Ga. App. 355, 129 S.E. 557 (1925).
24. Lincoln v. Gay, 164 Mass. 537, 42 N.E. 95 (1895).
25. Flint & Walling Mfg. Co. v. Beckett, 167 Ind.491, 79 N.E. 503 (1906).
26. Stafford v. Gowing, 236 Iowa 171, 18 N.W.2d 156 (1945); Annot., 18
A.L.R.2d 1326 (1951).
27. Daegling v. Gilmore, 49 Ill. 248 (1868).
28. Van Nortwick v. Holbine, 62 Neb. 147, 86 N.W. 1057 (1901).
29. Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. St. 45, 25 Pac. 1072

(1891).

30. 25 Pac. at 1073.

31. Lewis v. LaNier, 84 Colo. 376, 270 Pac. 656 (1928) (road contractor);
Hand v. Harrison, 99 Ga. App. 429, 108 S.E.2d 814 (1959) (installing steam
table); Pinnix v. Toomey, 242 N.C. 358, 87 S.E.2d 893 (1955); 34 N.C.L. Rev.
253 (plumber); Boyd, Higgens & Goforth, Inc. v. Mahone, 142 Va. 690, 128
S.E. 259 (1925) (road contractor).
32. Green v. Hanson, 103 Cal. App. 430, 284 Pac. 1082 (1930) (raising level
of building).
33. Van Nortwick v. Holbine, 62 Neb. 147, 86 N.W. 1057 (1901) (thresher).
34. Welter v. M. & M. Woodworking Co., 338 P.2d 651, 655 (Ore. 1959)
(logging road).
35. Pinnix v. Toomey, 242 N.C. 358, 87 S.E.2d 893, 898 (1955).
36. "[Tlhe law required at his hands only the exercise of reasonable means
and efforts to furnish good and well-constructed machinery, of good material,
adapted to the work in hand, combining the greatest safety with practical use.
He was not an insurer of plaintiff's property, and was not, as stated in the
instruction, bound to come with safe machinery, so that, by the exercise of

ordinary care, absolute security would be afforded." Holman v. Boston Land
& Security Co., 20 Colo. 7, 36 Pac. 797, 799 (1894) (thresher). But see Mayer
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accepted customs and procedures adopted by others engaged in substantially the same trade or business in the community. 7 Evidence
of accepted customs is frequently introduced by either the plaintiff
or the defendant by way of expert testimony. 8 In Stafford V. Gowing,3 9 testimony of a plumber had the double-barrelled effect of establishing negligence on the part of the defendant and the lack of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Plaintiff went to
defendant's plumbing shop to procure a piece of soil pipe. In cutting
the pipe to the desired length the defendant caused it to chip and a
splinter struck plaintiff in the eye, seriously impairing his vision. The
defendant contended that he had used the customary method in cutting the pipe and that plaintiff should have known that soil pipe would
splinter. Another plumber testified that no reputable plumber would
employ the method used by defendant in cutting pipe, and further
testified that he did not know that soil pipe would splinter until he
became a plumber. The plaintiff recovered. Evidence of custom was
used defensively in Rawls v. Ziegler,40 where the court held:
The evidence as to the standard practice in the community of placing five-

yard bodies on two-ton chassis is, without more, sufficient to discharge
Cecil & Bruce from legal liability to plaintiffs for assembling a five-yard
body on a two-ton chassis in accordance with their directions from Luby.41
In the thoroughly entertaining case of Vann v. Ionta, 2 the plaintiff
became tickled while seated in a barber's chair and during the
excitement he grabbed the barber's razor cutting his hand in the
process. The court, in holding that the barber had shown no "unusual

propensity for fooling around with customers" 43 discussed the customs
of the barbering trade from the days of the prophet Ezekiel down to
the twentieth century.
So that, while admitting the talking, Jimmie tenders the proposition
that barbering and talking go hand in hand, and that although the conversation evokes laughter, there can be no negligence based on that fact
alone....
Common observation furnishes proof that the barber is truly a philosophic person, of amiable and tractable disposition, ready to be accomodating, and always dispensing vocal wares with varying degrees of
v. Thompson-Hutchison Bldg. Co., 104 Ala. 611, 16 So. 620, 624 (1894), where
the court said: "It is next contended by the defendant that it was impossible

to erect a scaffold or safeguards .... We do not think this any excuse. The

defendants were under no compulsion to erect the building." (building contractor).
37. See generally MoRRs, STuDiEs IN THE LAw op TORTS 214 (1952).

38. Id. at 1.

39. 236 Iowa 171, 18 N.W.2d 156 (1945).

40.
41.
42.
43.

107 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1958).
Id. at 605.
157 Misc. 461, 284 N.Y. Supp. 278 (Mun. Ct. 1935).
284 N.Y. Supp. at 286.
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humor and intelligence, while the razor follows the facial contours and,
maybe the course of least resistance, depending upon when it was last
sharpened. That barbers talk cannot be disputed. Some talk more, some
less, some humorously, some not, but talk they do. It is traditional and
hereditary with them."44
To support a recovery on the ground of negligence in failing to
comply with an alleged business custom, it is often held that the
custom must be general and well established, so as to raise a presumption that the defendant knew it, or that he had actual knowledge of
45
it.
Or, as is sometimes stated, the custom must be "certain, reasonable, distinct, uncontradicted, continued and so notorious as to be
probably known to all parties to be controlled by it. ' ' 46 It is error to
admit evidence of an extraordinarily safe practice followed in an iso47
lated case.
There may be circumstances, of course, under which a reasonably
prudent man should depart from trade custom. 48 An obvious example
of such a situation was presented in Alston v. Stewart.49 There the
defendant, a stone contractor, received permission from the brick contractor to use his scaffold but was told that the scaffold should be
braced before using it for such heavy work. Defendant used the scaffold as it was, and the scaffold collapsed injuring the plaintiff. The
court held that it was proper to exclude plaintiff's proffered evidence
that it was a custom of the building trade for the stone to "go over"
the bricklayer's scaffold. There may also be circumstances where the
custom should not be followed in any event because the members of
the trade have not set their standards high enough. As the court
pointed out in McCollum v. O'Neil:50
The fact that there was evidence that closing the valves before disconnecting a radiator constituted standard plumbing practice, where the
disconnection was to be temporary is immaterial since the standard is
" ot what men ordinarily do under like circumstances, but what reasonably prudent and careful men, having regard for the rights and safety of
others, do under like circumstances." 51
44. Id. at 280, 282.
45. Boyd v. Graham, 5 Mo. App. 403 (1878) (plumber).
46. Jemison v. Pfeifer, 397 Pa. 81, 152 A.2d 697 (1959) (razing building).
47. In Johannsen v. Peter P. Woboril, Inc., 260 Wis. 341, 51 N.W.2d 53, 55
(1952), where a painting contractor was charged with negligence, the court
held that: "The admission of plaintiff's evidence of the practice and regulations under which Bucyrus-Erie Company handled inflammable liquids was
error. It appears that the Company required it to be transported and kept
in one-gallon red cans with self-closing tops. The operations of Woboril, Inc.
and of Bucyrus-Erie Company differ so greatly that we consider their respective use of inflammables is not to be judged by the same standard, at least
on the present record, in determining whether the method was as safe as the
nature of Woboril's work would reasonably permit."
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 295A (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1959).
49. 2 Monag. 51 (Pa. 1889).
50. 128 Mont. 584, 281 P.2d 493 (1955).
51. 281 P.2d at 496.
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Since we are dealing with cases involving a failure to perform
skillfully, it naturally follows that the expert witness will frequently
play an important role.52 He may not only testify as to whether the
defendant followed an accepted trade custom, but he may express an
opinion as to whether the net result of the defendant's labor was to
create a potentially dangerous condition, 3 and whether the condition
so created was the cause of the injury.54 But where the dangerous
condition would be obvious to an unskilled person, the plaintiff need
not introduce expert testimony in order to prove his case. 55
Oftentimes there is no direct evidence of negligence to be had and
the plaintiff must rely on a combination of circumstantial evidence
and expert testimony or invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.5 6
The doctrine has been rather freely applied to cases involving barbers
and beauticians5 7 and to cases involving other trades5 8 if the injury
occurs prior to the time that the defendant relinquishes control of the
instrumentality. 59 Even when the defendant is not in actual possession but still has "management" 60 of the instrumentality, there is
little difficulty in applying the doctrine. But when the work has
been completed and turned over to the contractee the so-called requirement of "exclusive control" 61 is still a problem, 62 though not as
much so as in former times. The more modern approach is that the
doctrine may apply even though the defendant has relinquished control if the plaintiff can show that the mechanism has not been tam52. See generally MonRis, STUDIES
iN THE LAW OF TORTS 1 (1952).
53. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Deering, 188 Ky. 708, 223 S.W. 1095 (1920)
(defective scaffold); Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d
517 (1949) (defective steel tank).
54. '"xpert opinion as to the cause of an accident is always admissible
where the facts depend upon circumstances rather than direct evidence." 68
A.2d at 525. See also Spoelter v. Four-Wheel Brake Service Co., 99 Cal. App.
2d 690, 222 P.2d 307 (1950) (garageman).
55. "The question as to whether or not the construction was defective was
not of such a character that only persons of skill and experience were capable
of forming a correct judgment about it. There was no complicated machinery
and no question of science or skill. The facts with reference to the nailing of
the cleat, and the cleat itself, were before the jury, and they were competent
to form an opinion as to whether any defects existed." Colbert v. Holland
Furnace Co., 331 Ill. 78, 164 N.E. 162 (1928), 60 A.L.R. 353 (1929) (installing
furnace).
56. See generally PROSSER, TORTS § 42 (2d ed. 1955).
57. Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 860, 877 (1950).
58. Annots., 18 A.L.R. 2d 1326, 1330 (1951) (oil burning heating appliances),
3 A.L.R.2d 1448 (1949) (electrical appliances).
59. John Rooff & Sons v. Winterbottom, 249 Iowa 122, 86 N.W.2d 131 (1957)
(sparks from acetylene torch set fire to plaintiff's building while defendant
was erecting a roof).
60. Central Arizona Light & Power Co. v. Bell, 49 Ariz. 99, 64 P.2d 1249
(1937) (gas appliance), Michener v. Hutton, 203 Cal. 604, 265 Pac. 238 (1928),
59 A.L.R. 480 (1929) (vent pipe).
61. PROSSER,TORTS 204-08 (2d ed. 1955).
62. See, e.g., Wagner v. Associated Shower Door Co., 99 So. 2d 619 (Fla.
1958) (glass door).
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pered with since it left the defendant's possession. 63
A fairly recent development with respect to the standard of skill
and care required of a skilled craftsman is the tendency to establish
certain standard procedures by statute or administrative order; 64 and
as the coverage of these statutes and regulations becomes more comprehensive day by day, they play an increasingly important role in
negligence cases. 65 As is true of tort cases generally, the plaintiff, in
order to found his charge of negligence on the violation of a safety
order or statute, must show that he is a member of the class of persons
whom the legislature intended to protect. 66 Violation of a safety order

68
may be only evidence of negligence, 67 or it may be negligence per se,
and presumably compliance with a safety order would be evidence
of ordinary care.69 Such compliance would not preclude a finding of
negligence, however, where a reasonable man would take additional
70
precautions.

63. Plunkett v. United Electric Service, 214 La. 145, 36 So. 2d 704 (1948), 3

A.L.R.2d 1437 (1949) (central heating unit).
64. See generally MoIus, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 141-213 (1952).
Safety statutes and orders frequently encounter constitutional obstacles. See,
e.g., Hillman v. Northern Wasco County People's District, 323 P.2d 664 (Ore.
1958), where a statute providing that the National Electric Code as approved
by the American Standards Association should be the electrical code of
Oregon was declared unconstitutional on the ground that it was unlawful
delegation of legislative power. And see Electrical Contractor's Ass'n v.
McLaughlin, 153 F. Supp. 653 (D.D.C. 1957), where an order of the Board of
Commissioners which would require any electrical installation over a certain capacity to be approved by a professional electrical engineer was struck
down as being arbitrary and unreasonable and having no relation to public
health and safety.
65. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) TORTS § 286 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1959).
66. In Sumner v. Lambert, 96 Ohio App. 53, 121 N.E.2d 189 (1953), the
court held that evidence as to the specific safety requirements relating to
construction work adopted by the Industrial Commission of Ohio were inadmissible because the requirements related only to employers and their employees. But in Porter v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 48 Cal. 2d 846, 313 P.2d
854 (1957), the court held that safety orders and provisions of the Labor
Code were intended to protect the public generally and not merely employees.
67. In Webb v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 308 P.2d 350 (Cal. App. 1957),
aifd, 49 Cal. 2d 509, 319 P.2d 621 (1957), the defendant's agent improperly
installed bottled propane gas tanks in the plaintiff's house. The court held
that it was proper to admit in evidence the Liquified Petroleum Gases Safety
Order. In an earlier case in the same jurisdiction the court held that it was
proper to instrtuct the jury that violation of the safety orders would constitute
evidence as a matter of law. Atherley v. McDonald, Young & Nelson, Inc., 142
Cal. App. 2d 575, 298 P.2d 700 (1956).
68. Lutz Industries v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 88 S.E.2d 333
(1955). In another'case decided the same day in the same jurisdiction the
court admitted relevant provisions of a building code into evidence but failed
to state that a violation of the code would constitute negligence per se. _Pinnix
v. Toomey, 242 N.C. 358, 87 S.E.2d 893 (1955) 34 N.C.L. Rev. 253.
69. Such a rule has been applied to public utilities where the National
Electrical Code has been brought into evidence; Isbell v. Union Light Heat
and Power Co., 162 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Ky. 1958); Daniel v. Oklahoma Gas
& Elec. Co., 329 P.2d 1060 (Okla. 1958); and there is no apparent reason why
the same rule would not apply to private persons.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 288c (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1959).
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A craftsman is generally held to be free from negligence if he per7
forms his work according to the plans of an architect or engineer '
unless a craftsman of "ordinary prudence would be put upon notice
that the work was dangerous and likely to cause injury."72 But in
determining whether the craftsman was justified in following the
architect's plans, at least one court has applied two tests: whether a
reasonably competent contractor would have noticed the defect; and
whether this particular contractor by reason of his possessing some
73
special skill or knowledge should have noticed the defect.
As has been pointed out, a person who engages in a particular line
of work must possess such skill as is usually possessed by persons in
that field. In a recent English case 74 a plaintiff sought to apply this
doctrine to a "do it yourself" carpenter. The defendant had repaired
the door handle in his own home, and the plaintiff, an invitee, was
injured when the handle came loose from the door. The plaintiff
contended that since the defendant had seen fit to engage in carpenter
work he should be held to the same standards as a professional carpenter, and the plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show that a
professional carpenter would have used larger screws than had been
used by the defendant. But the court refused to go that far. It said:
[W]e think the standard of care and skill demanded of the defendant

in order to discharge his duty of care to the plaintiff in the fixing of the
new handle in the present case must be the degree of care and skill to be
expected of a reasonably competent carpenter doing the work in question.
This does not mean that the degree of care and skill required is to be
measured by reference to the contractual obligations as to the quality of
his work assumed by a professional carpenter working for reward, which
would, in our view, set the standard too high. The question is simply
71. Person v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 187 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 936 (1951) (electrical contractor); Rawls v. Ziegler, 107 So. 2d
601 (Fla. 1958) (mounting body on truck); Daegling v. Gilmore, 49 Ill. 248
(1868) (brick contractor); Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 1 App.
Div. 2d 559, 152 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1956), rev'd on other grounds, 3 N.Y.2d 137,
143 N.E.2d 895 (1957) (building contractor) Ryan v. Feeney & Sheehan
Bldg. Corp., 239 N.Y. 43, 145 N.E. 321 (1924) (building contractor). Contra,
Blendinger v. Souders, 2 Monag. 48 (Pa. 1889) (building contractor).
72. Ryan v. Feeney & Sheehan Bldg. Corp., 239 N.Y. 43, 145 N.E. 321 (1924).
73. In Person v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 187 F.2d 832, 836 (2d Cir. 1951),
both the electrical contractor and the general contractor had been joined as
defendants. As to the electrical contractor the court held: "The standard of
responsibility for the ordinary contractor is that usually possessed by persons
in his place; and it should be proved like any other such fact. The subcontractor at bar was prima facie of this class; it was only a contractor,
although an electrical contractor; and it was charged with only so much
competence to pass on plans as such contractors ordinarily have." But as
to the general contractor the court held: "Having employed such a specialist
[an electrical engineer] the law of New York imposed upon it a duty
measured by the skill of that specialist; it had removed itself from the class
of 'ordinary contractors.' It was correct, therefore, to charge the jury that,
if an electrical engineer would have thought the rigging of Pole No. 1422
'obviously' or 'patently' improper, the contractor was liable."
74. Wells v. Cooper, [1958] 2 Q.B. 265.
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what steps would a reasonably competent carpenter wishing to fix a

handle such as this securely to a door such as this have taken with a
view to achieving that object.75
II. LiABLITYTo THImR PARTIms
Throughout the early history of the common law, the courts could
see no basis for allowing a party to maintain an action for breach of
a duty created by contract unless the complaining party could estab7
lish privity.76 But just as the law of property had its Tulk V. Moxhay"
8
and contract law had its Lawrence v. Fox, the law of torts has had
its MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Co.79 Prior to MacPhersonthe almost
universally accepted general rule was that a manufacturer or repairer of chattels, or a person creating or repairing structures on land
would not be liable to a third person not in privity of contract for
negligent manufacture, construction or repair.80 Some exceptions to
this rule had developed where the instrumentality was of such a nature that negligence by the maker would inevitably place human life
in danger, 81 and an occasional case allowed recovery where the instrumentality was not a thing of "imminent danger." 82 But with these few
exceptions the general rule would not permit recovery in the absence
of privity.
In MacPherson, Chief Judge Cardozo 83 established the rule that a
manufacturer would be liable to third persons "if the nature of a
thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in
peril when negligently made ... ."84 As to manufacturers some courts
have interpreted the MacPhersoncase as having "caused the exception
to swallow up the asserted general rule of non-liability, leaving nothing upon which that rule could operate."85
Although MacPherson involved a manufacturer, the case has been
75. [1958] 2 Q.B. at 271. As to the standard of care required of a lessor

who voluntarily undertakes to make repairs for his lessee see RESTATEMENT,

TORTS § 362 (1934). But cf. Bartlett v. Taylor, 351 Mo. 1060, 174 S.W.2d 844
(1943).
76. See generally PROSSER, TORTS §§ 84, 85 (2d ed. 1955).
77. 2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
78. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).

79. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).

80. See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402
(Ex.1842).

81. See Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470, 42 Am. Rep. 311 (1882) (negligent
construction of scaffold); Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455
(1852)

(false label on poison).

82. See, e.g., Fish v. Kirlin-Gray Elec. Co., 18 S.D. 122, 99 N.W. 1092 (1904)
(arc light installed in church).
83. F'or a discussion of Judge Cardozo's influence in this area of tort law,

see Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. REv. 372,
376-79 (1939).
84. 111 N.E.at 1052.
85. Carter v.Yardley Co., 2F19 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693, 700 (1946), 164 A.L.R.
559.
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extended to cover repairers of chattels and persons erecting or repairing structures on the land. But as of this writing there has been
a more liberal application to the former category than to the latter.
A. Liability of Negligent Repairersof Chattels
One of the earlier cases to apply the MacPherson doctrine to repairers of chattels was Kalinowski v. Truck Equipment Company.80
There the court was able to bridge the gap between the manufacturer
and the repairer with comparative ease, because the truck had been
almost completely rebuilt. And in a later case involving the law of
Kansas, a federal court seemed to lean on the same "slender reed" by
holding an aircraft company liable either as a manufacturer or as
a repairer.87 But most courts no longer take this approach.
Most of the decided cases deal with repairers of automobiles, and
the tendency is in the direction of the rule set forth in Zierer v.
Danies 88 to the effect that one who contracts to repair an automobile
and negligently performs 89 is liable in tort to third persons for resulting bodily harm or property damage 9 unless the owner knew of the
defect 9' or by the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered
the defect before the accident. 92 The present Restatement rule is somewhat more conservative in that it would limit recovery to bodily
injury.93

B. Liability of Negligent Builders and Repairers of Structures on Land
The orthodox general rule as to independent contractors is that they
are "not liable to a third person receiving injury or damage as a result
of the negligent construction of the work, after the completion and
86. 237 App. Div. 472, 261 N.Y. Supp. 657 (1933), affd per curiam, 270 N.Y.
532, 200 N.E. 304 (1936).
87. Vrooman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 183 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1950).
88. 40 N.J. Super. 130, 122 A.2d 377 (1956). See also Moody v. Martin
Motor Co., 76 Ga. App. 456, 46 S.E.2d 197 (1948); Central & Southern Truck
Lines v. Westfall G.M.C. Truck, Inc., 317 S.W.2d 841 (Mo. App. 1958).
89. In the Zierer case the complaint charged the defendant with misfeasance "and perhaps also with nonfeasance," but the court treats the case

as essentially one of misfeasance. As to the difference in attitude of the

courts toward misfeasance and nonfeasance, see generally PROSSER, TORTS §
81 (2d ed. 1955).

And compare Bock v. Truck & Tractor Co., 18 Wash. 2d

458, 139 P.2d 706 (1943) with Hanson v. Blackwell Motor Co., 143 Wash. 547,
255 Pac. 939 (1927).

90. The MacPherson doctrine, taken literally would restrict recovery to
personal injuries (see note 82 supra and corresponding quotation in text),
and most of the decided cases deal with personal injuries only. But property
damages were allowed in the Zierer case and in the Central & Southern Truck
Lines case.
91. If the garageman expressly warns the owner that the vehicle is not
safe, then the garageman is not liable. Jewell v. Dell, 284 S.W.2d 92 (Ky.
1955).
92. Where the repairman conceals the defects.he is liable. Burkett v. Globe
Indemnity Co., 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316 (1938).
93. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 404 (1934).
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acceptance thereof by the contractee or owner." 94 Although the general rule was not followed in all the jurisdictions, 95 it represented the
overwhelming weight of authority, and it was applied in dramatic
fashion in Ford v. Sturgis,9 s referred to by Dean Prosser as the
"worst of the common law horrors. '97 The court in refusing to hold
a contractor liable when a roof caved in killing several persons, said:
The reason sometimes given for this conclusion is that otherwise there
would be no end to suits. It is elsewhere given as a better ground that the
negligence of the owner in maintaining the defective building, and not
that of the builder in constructing it, is the true proximate cause of the
third person's injury.98

9 9 where
The Ford case was expressly overruled in Hanna v. Fletcher,
an iron contractor was held liable to a third person when a negligently repaired iron railing collapsed. And of the several cases cited
in the Ford case in support of the orthodox rule, only one retains its
original vitality.100
As a prelude to the confusion that is with us today, the Hanna case
received contrary interpretations as to the exact breadth of its holding.
One writer interpreted it to mean that "an independent contractor
who negligently repairs a structure, making it a thing of inherent
danger, is liable to third parties not in privity of contract .... ."101 But
another stated that "the Hanna case in effect omits the imminently
dangerous limitation and allows plaintiff to recover if he can show
only negligence and proximate causation. 10o2
As of today there are at least four separate and distinct doctrines
as to third party liability in this area. They may be summarized as
follows:

(1) Orthodox rule-no liability to third parties after completion
10 3
and acceptance by the.owner.
94. Clyde v. Sumerel, 104 S.E.2d 392, 393 (S.C. 1958). A formal acceptance
of the work is not required.

95. See, e.g., Brown v. Smith, 121 Minn. 165, 141 N.W. 2 (1913) (plumber).
96. 14 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1926).
97. SMTrH & PPOSSER, CASES ON ToRTs 922 (2d ed. 1957).
98. 14 F.2d at 254.
99. 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989 (1956), 18
NACCA L.J. 273.
100. None of the cases cited in Ford have been expressly overruled, but
they have been distinguished, explained and questioned until they could no
longer be considered authority for the hard and fast rule of nonliability to
third parties. Only Thornton v. Dow, 60 Wash. 622, ll- Pac. 899 (1910)
remains unscathed, but it could be seriously questioned whether that case

ever stood for the orthodox rule since the defendant, a contractor, had fol-

lowed the plans of an architect.
101. 44 GEo. L.J. 534 (1956).
102. Comment, 14 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 155, 164 (1957).

103. E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. v. Kessinger, 259 F.2d 411 (5th Cir.

1958); Clyde v. Sumeral, 104 S.E.2d 392 (S.C. 1958); Thornton v. Dow, 60
Wash. 622, 11 Pac. 899 (1910).
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(2) Orthodox rule subject to three exceptions;, ',W
(a) Where the instrumentality is dangerous in its normal or
nondefective state, e.g., explosives and poisons.
(b) Where the instrumentality is to be used for particular purposes requiring security for protection of life, such as a
scaffold.
(c) When the contractor deceitfully conceals the defect. 0 4
(3) Orthodox rule subject to exception where the instrumentality
is likely to place life and limb in danger if negligently made.
(The MacPherson approach).105
(4) The orthodox rule is no longer a part of the law. The contractor should be held to a general standard of reasonable care
for the protection of third parties. 0 6 (The Pros.er approach).107
In some of the jurisdictions the law in this regard is still in a state
of flux. The courts have indicated that they will follow a liberal
doctrine but have not yet spelled it out. 08
In view of the tremendous impact of MacPherson upon the common
law of torts, and the persuasive influence of Dean Prosser, 09 it
seems safe to join in the prediction by the editors of the American
Law Reports: "As the modern view gains more and more support
among the leading jurisdictions it seems to predict that the general
rejection of the old privity of contract rule as to building contractors
104. Watts v. Bacon & Van Buskirk Glass Co., 20 Ill. Anp. 2d 164, 155 N.E.2d
333 (1959). See also Price v. Johnston Cotton Co. of Wendall, 226 N.C. 758,
40 S.E.2d 344 (1946); Hartford v. Coolidge-Locher Co., 314 S.W.2d 445 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1958), 37 T.x. L. REV. 354.
105. Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Qir. 1956); Del Guadio v. Ingerson, 142 Conn. 564, 115 A.2d 665 (1955); Flavin v. Kay, 108 So. 2d 462 (Fla.
1959); Hand v. Harrison, 99 Ga. App. 429, 108 S.E.2d 814 (1959); Holland

Furnace Co. v. Nauracaj, 105 Ind. App. 574, 14 N.E.2d 339 (1938); Kendrick
v. Mason, 234 La. 271, 99 So. 2d 108 (1958); Inman v. Binghamton Housing
Authority, 1 App. Div. 559, 152 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1956), 10 VAND. L. REV. 156,
55 MrcH. L. REV. 603, rev'd, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895 (1956) (reversed on
ground that complaint failed to allege any "latent defect" or "concealed
danger"); Roush v. Johnson, 139 W.Va. 607, 80 S.E.2d 857 (1954); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 385 (1934).

106. Tomchik v. Julian, 340 P.2d 72 (Cal. App. 1959); Russell v. Arthur
Whitcomb, Inc., 100 N.H. 171, 121 A.2d 781 (1956) (included property damage).
107. PROSSER, TORTS § 85 (2d ed. 1955).

108. See, e.g., Benton Harbor Malleable Industries v. Pearson Construction
Co., 348 Mich. 371, 83 N.W.2d 429 (1956). Compare Miller v. Davis & Averill,
Inc., 137 N.J.L. 671, 61 A.2d 253 (1948) with Zierer v. Daniels, 40 N.J. Super.

130, 122 A.2d 377 (1956) (holding that third parties may recover against
negligent repairers of chattels).
109. In Russell v. Arthur Whitcomb, Inc., 100 N.H. 171, 121 A.2d 781 (1956),
the court quoted from Dean Prosser's text and then unequivocably made the

quotation the law of the state.
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is merely a matter of time."" 0 And this general rejection would
apply equally to electricians, plumbers, carpenters, painters and all
other skilled trades.
III. CONCLUSION
The more recent cases in this area of tort law emphasize the
modern trend toward liberality and the concern for the safety and
security of the general public as opposed to the encouragement of
private enterprise. A specialization grows, as men gather into groups
ostensibly to raise their standards as well as their pay, as legislators
prescribe examinations as conditions precedent to licensing,"' the
jacks-of-all-trades, the neophytes, and the untutored are placed
more and more in jeopardy. And as the doctrine of privity crumbles
the risks become greater and the circumference of liability larger.
Any adverse criticism of this trend would certainly run counter to
modern legal theory; but a considered reappraisal of the present
course toward universal recovery might be in order. Granted the
widow of a man who is killed when a roof falls on him should be
entitled to recover from the negligent builder. But how much more
protection does the public need? May there not be a difference between a mortal or crippling injury to the person and mere damage to
property? It would seem justifiable to draw the line of third-party
liability between the personal injury cases and the property damage
cases, so as to afford a reasonable degree of protection to the public
and still leave some room for the encouragement of private enterprise.
Jerry L. Moore
110. Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 865, 872 (1958).
111. A recent Tennessee statute which would have required watchmakers
to pass such an examination on the subject as the state board of examiners
might prescribe was declared unconstitutional in Livesay v. Tennessee Bd. of
Examiners, 322 S.W.2d 209 (Tenn. 1959). The court could not imagine how
such requirements would have any real tendency to promote the public
morals, health or safety.

